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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the interaction between ownership structure, taken as a proxy for 
shareholders’ commitment, and customer satisfaction - the main driver of consumer loyalty - and their 
impact on a firm’s brand equity. The results show that customer satisfaction has a positive direct effect 
on brand equity but an indirect negative one because of reductions in ownership concentration. This 
latter effect emerges when managers are mainly customer-oriented. Such result gives out a warning 
signal that highlights the perverse effect of implementing policies, focused excessively on satisfying 
customers at the expense of shareholders, on a firm’s brand equity. The empirical analysis uses an 
incomplete panel data comprising 69 firms from 11 nations, for the period 2002-2005. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mühlbacher, Hemetsberger, Thelen, Vallaster, Massimo, Füller, Pirker, Schorn and Kittinger 
(2006) define brands as complex social phenomena where different stakeholders have a role in 
creating brand value. This point of view departs from the traditional perspective that relies on a market 
orientation which considers managers as individuals, who define strategies to maximize value, by 
focusing mainly on customers. Recently, some authors begin to recognize such limitations and 
propose a wider perspective that integrates different stakeholders (Greenley, Hooley and Rudd, 2005). 
Stakeholders provide different types of resources to a firm thereby enhancing its value. Remarkably, 
customers and shareholders are the only stakeholders that provide the firm with financial capital. 
Hence, these stakeholders should play a relevant role to the enhancement of a firm’s value. Anderson, 
Fornell and Mazvancheryl (2004) confirm this for customers by relying on the reduction in risk, based 
on the decrease in future cash flow volatility, when customers are loyal. Also, Mittal, Anderson, 
Sayrak and Tadikamalla (2005) show a connection between customer satisfaction (CS) and long-term 
financial performance. For shareholders, a wide amount of literature based on the seminal work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrates the connection between shareholder commitment and firm 
value. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Shareholders with a significant stake will be particularly 
committed to a firm otherwise  they would put at risk a significant proportion of their wealth. Hence, 
they would have adequate incentives to monitor the manager in order to preclude any opportunistic 
behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which, in turn, will have a positive impact on financial 
performance. Thus, ownership concentration is a natural proxy for shareholder satisfaction and 
commitment.  
This paper studies the relationship between customer satisfaction and ownership concentration 
(OC) and then follows up by investigating their impact on brand equity (BE) as a performance 
measure (Keller, 1993; Srivastava, Shervani and Fahey, 1998). 
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The main finding is that both these dimensions are very closely connected. Therefore, a 
manager aiming to improve a firm’s brand equity, cannot implement marketing tools that affect one 
stakeholder without considering the effect on the other. More specifically, costly customer-targeted 
marketing policies may lead to satisfied customers consolidating their linkages with the firm. 
However, shareholders may consider a strategy focused mainly on satisfying customers as managerial 
entrenchment (Cespa and Cestone, 2004). Entrenched managers may satisfy customers’ interests in 
order to protect themselves from the disciplinary pressure from shareholders. In such a situation, 
existing shareholders’ interest in the firm decreases and they will reduce their stake. This reduction in 
ownership concentration may also be interpreted negatively by potential new investors, who prefer 
firms with visible shareholders (blockholders), giving rise to a negative effect on brand equity. The 
empirical analysis shows that this negative effect appears for large values of CS and may far outweigh 
the positive direct effect of CS on BE. Hence, a manager should take into account the reaction from 
customers as well as investors, in order to maximize a firm’s BE. 
These results question the effectiveness of several methods of improving customers’ loyalty by 
bundling a firm’s products together with its shares. Also, these findings put several workers’ 
compensation packages under the spotlight; these combine discounted prices for products with option-
like schemes that transfer shares. These strategies share common ground with some recent marketing 
perspectives aimed at generating internalization (Festinger, 1953) with respect to several stakeholders, 
in order to develop a strong corporate identity (Chernatony and Harris, 2000). Although capable of 
turning several stakeholders, like workers, into satisfied customers, these packages may have a 
negative impact on BE value through reductions in the OC. 
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2/ THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. 
The theoretical model (see below) explains the interaction between OC, CS and BE. This model 
recognizes a bidirectional connection between OC and CS and an effect (both direct and indirect) of 
each variable on a firm’s BE: 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
2.1 The interaction between customer satisfaction and ownership concentration 
2.1.1. From shareholders to customers 
The presence of blockholders in concentrated ownership structures generates customer 
confidence (Power and Whelan, 2006). Identifying with the organization may also enhance the 
support and commitment from other stakeholders (Chernatony and Harris, 2000) and improve CS. 
Other papers that study the linkage between ownership structure and corporate social performance 
(CSP), of which CS is a relevant component find that long-term institutional owners, who generally 
are controlling blockholders, affect a firm’s CSP positively (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), Also, Barnea 
and Rubin (2005) argue that large blockholders may fully benefit from being associated with a large 
CSP firm. This will stimulate the implementation of socially responsible actions that will lead to CS. 
These arguments suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: OC has a positive impact on CS. 
2.1.2. From customers to shareholders. 
Different arguments can justify the connection from CS to OC. First, firms whose managers 
follow a market-oriented perspective, focused mainly on satisfying customers, may lose their 
competitive advantage by neglecting the interests of other stakeholders which, in turn, will affect 
financial results detrimentally. However, this strategy may be in the interests of a manager who 
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pursues private benefits extraction that could erode profits. This strategy allows the manager canvass 
support from customers to shield him from any disciplinary pressure from shareholders (entrenchment 
strategy). Pagano and Volpin (2005) use that argument to justify that firms may offer long-term labor 
contracts for improving workers’ satisfaction and deter takeover threads (entrenchment mechanism). 
Moreover, the manager can even disguise this decrease in profits, linked to private benefits extraction, 
as the consequence of implementing a policy aimed at customer satisfaction. In this context, 
blockholders would tend to reduce their stake in firms where a manager embarks on such an 
entrenchment strategy. Also, after having gained the support of customers, managers may reduce their 
own stakes because these stakes would then not be so vital to seeing off the pressure from other 
shareholders (e.g. as a way of preventing potential takeovers). In both cases a reduction in ownership 
concentration follows. An example may be enlightening: when Coca Cola tried to change the flavor of 
Coke in 1985, some customers organized pressure groups to agitate against such a change. The mass 
media also leaned in favor of the customers given that Coke is an icon of the American way of life. 
Finally, the CEO of Coca Cola (Roberto Goizueta) decided to maintain both classic coke as well as the 
new one. This decision was very costly for Coca Cola and a major marketing flop that should have 
cost Goizueta his post as CEO. However, he retained his position as CEO by justifying such a move 
based on to customer satisfaction. Not surprisingly, investors were unhappy with such an outcome and 
penalized Coca Cola shares and some institutional investors decided to reduce their stakes in the 
company, thus, diminishing OC. In this example Goizueta used CS as an entrenchment mechanism 
and the final outcome was a reduction in ownership concentration (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Coke). 
A second channel connecting customers and investors emerges when satisfied customers with a 
firm’s products go a step further and become shareholders of that firm. Then, the decision to become a 
shareholder is a latter stage of an internalization process (Festinger, 1953); customers increasingly 
identify with a specific corporate image and, in the extreme, want to become part of that image. 
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On other occasions, the firm stimulates the link between CS and OC. For example, as a result of 
bundling products with shares. In this scenario, loyal customers receive shares directly from the firm 
(e.g. Puleva, a Spanish food company). A second example is when workers get shares as part of their 
compensation package in addition to discounted prices for a firm’s products. The outcome of this 
process where customers become shareholders – of their own volition or through bundling - should 
lead to a reduction in the ownership concentration as customers are generally small investors. The 
previous arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CS has a negative impact on OC. 
2.2. Financing Channel: Connecting ownership structure to brand equity 
The presence of blockholders affects a firm’s value in different ways. One effect relates directly 
to investors’ decisions on financial markets. The other effect is indirect, through the aforementioned 
impact on CS, which also affects a firm’s value. 
With regard to the direct financing channel, the presence of blockholders has an ambiguous 
effect on a firm’s value. On the one hand, large blockholders may expropriate minority shareholders 
and destroy value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), whereas on the other, 
the presence of large blockholders hinders the value-reducing agency problems linked to opportunistic 
managerial behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The combined result from both effects is not clear. 
However, for listed firms (as in the sample), when blockholders increase their stake, they will have a 
greater inclination to expropriate because they can then generate private benefits and delegate the 
control of errant managers to the financial markets (cross-monitoring hypothesis, Booth, 1992). This 
balance suggests the existence of a neutral or a negative direct impact of OC on BE. 
Focusing on the indirect channel, OC has a positive impact on a firm’s brand equity through 
variations in CS. On the one hand, Hypothesis 1 relies on different arguments suggesting a strong 
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positive relationship between OC and CS; on the other hand, CS has a positive overall impact on a 
firm’s BE because of the loyalty of satisfied customers, as discussed below. 
From this discussion, the indirect positive effect connecting OC to brand equity would outweigh 
the direct negative or neutral, ones. This effect defines the third hypothesis (see Figure 2): 
Hypothesis 3: OC has a positive indirect effect on brand equity through CS because OC affects 
CS positively and the latter has an overall positive effect on brand equity. Also, OC has a neutral or a 
negative effect on brand equity, giving rise to a positive overall effect. 
[Figure 2 here] 
2.3 Customer channel: Connecting customer satisfaction to brand equity 
Companies consider improved CS as the principal strategy to gain loyalty and ensure customer 
retention. The more loyal the firm’s customers, the less vulnerable it is from its competitors; this in 
turn, allows it to implement successful strategies to generate value (Anderson and Sullivan, 1993). CS 
is a major component of the broader concept of a firm’s CSP. This strategy is relevant because, 
according to the instrumental stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995), CSP is 
a mechanism for generating value. By behaving in a responsible way, firms obtain continued support 
from those stakeholders that are necessary to ensure access to valuable resources. Such support will 
improve their brand-equity value. Hence, a positive direct effect emerges connecting CS and a firm’s 
BE value. 
However, Hypothesis 2 states that CS has a negative impact on OC and the latter, according to 
Hypothesis 3, has an overall positive impact on brand equity. This result suggests the existence of an 
indirect negative channel connecting CS to brand equity through reductions in a firm’s OC. 
Finally, the comparison of the arguments that support the positive direct effect with the 
arguments explaining the negative indirect one, suggest that the direct effect will be more relevant for 
normal values of CS, while the indirect effect will appear mainly in more extreme values. Note that 
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only the existence of very satisfied customers allow the manager feel confident about being able to 
face the pressure from shareholders when he is extracting private benefits. In such a situation two 
consequences may follow. First, the manager will reduce his own stake. Second, significant 
blockholders will also reduce their stakes. In the same vein, only very satisfied costumers will become 
shareholders, thus reducing ownership concentration. Hence, the prediction is that the direct effect will 
be superior to the indirect one under normal circumstances but this may not be the case for extreme 
values of CS. (see Figure 3).  
Hypothesis 4: CS has a strong direct effect on brand equity as well as a negative indirect one 
resulting from reductions in OC, that appear mainly for large values of CS. Moreover, the overall 
effect is positive under normal conditions.  
[Figure 3 here] 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
3.1. Sample and Data 
The sample is the result of crossing three databases. The first database, OSIRIS contains 
information on standardized balance sheets in order to accommodate the wide variety of financial 
accounting practices across countries and industries. The second database, SiRi, is a product of 
Sustainable Investment Research International Company – the world’s largest company specialized in 
socially responsible investment (visit www.siricompany.com for more information). Finally, a 
third database –Interbrand (http://www.interbrand.com/surveys.asp)- provides information on brand 
equity of the most valuable companies. The review Business Week publishes this information every 
year. The final sample is a panel data of 69 companies from 11 countries for the period 2002-2005. 
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3.2. Analysis 
The following specification tests Hypotheses 1, concerning the connection between OC to CS: 
( ) ( )1 1 2 3 4 5_ _ &it it it i itit itCustomer Satisf Ownership Concen Size Leverage R Dα α α α α η ε+ = + + + + + +  (1) 
Where iη  is the firm-specific component of the error term. 
The SiRi score for the performance of firms in relation to their customers is the measure for 
Customer_Satisfaction (visit www.centreinfo.ch/doc/doc_site/SP-Novartis-06.pdf for an 
example of a detailed profile to compute the scores of the different stakeholders like 
customers, workers, suppliers, community, environment). The largest shareholders’ stake 
variable approaches ownership concentration (the results are the same using the stakes of the three 
and the five largest shareholders). As controls, specification (1) includes firm size (the number of 
employees on a log scale) because size affects a firm’s visibility and performance along with 
customer satisfaction (Ullman, 1985). The second control is financial structure; leverage, 
defined as debt-to-equity ratio, since the literature (Roberts, 1992; Waddock and Graves, 1997) 
shows that this variable is a traditional determinant of performance, as well as a measure of a firm’s 
risk (Leland, 1998) which will have an impact on the degree of satisfaction for different stakeholders. 
Concerning to R&D, defined as the ratio of R&D investments to the number of employees, this 
variable is an instrument of marketing expenses. As Hirons and Simons (1998) points out “Customer 
dissatisfaction with poor commercialisation of products indicates that an R&D manager must be 
proactive in coordinating marketing and manufacturing in technology transfer”. Lastly, the 
specification includes temporal, sectoral and country dummies.  
A similar specification to (1) explains the variable of OC and contrast Hypothesis 2. In 
particular, the specification is as follows: 
( ) ( )1 1 2 3 4 5_ _it it it i itit itOwnership Concen Customer Satisf Size Leverage ROAα α α α α η ε+ = + + + + + +  (2) 
  
10
 
In order to distinguish this specification from (1), a variable of performance, the return on assets, 
replaces R&D. This variable is a classical determinant of a firm’s ownership structure (Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the total assets.  
Note that specifications (1) and (2) show a double-sided relationship and suggest a 
different effect of OC on CS compared with the effect of CS on OC. This asymmetry 
precludes the use of SEM techniques given that a double relationship (a loop) only applies for 
explained (endogenous) variables, but not for explanatory variables like CS and OC in the 
specification of BE (see Figure 1) 
Concerning the test for Hypotheses 3 and 4, the specification used includes as dependent 
variable a firm’s brand equity and as explanatory variables CS and OC as well as different controls. In 
particular, the variables of Size, Leverage as well as the R&D intensity given that authors like Simon 
and Sullivan (1993) consider that R&D intensity and patents could be an important determinant of 
brand equity when technological innovation is of utmost importance to consumers. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 2 3
4 5 6
_ _ _
& ' '
it it it
i itit it it
Brand Equity Ownership Concentration Customer Satisfaction
Size Leverage R D
β β β
β β β η ε
+ = + + +
+ + + + +  (3) 
In all specifications, the estimation is in difference when the Hausman test reveals the existence 
of a correlation between unobservable heterogeneity iη  and the explanatory variables. Also, the 
dependent variables are lead by one period in all specifications in order to prevent endogeneity 
problems. Additionally, given specifications (1) and (2), endogeneity problems emerge that require 
using instruments of the main explanatory variable - ownership_concentration in specification (1) and 
customer_satisfaction in specification (2). The instruments adopted are the corresponding predicted 
values from specification (2) for ownership_concentration –see last column of Table 3-, and 
specification (1) for customer_satisfaction –see last column of Table 2. 
Departing from specification (3), the use of only one of the variables, OC or CS, but not both, 
allows studying the overall effect of each variable on brand equity. However, the use of both variables 
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together, as shown in specification (3), allows studying the direct effect of each variable on brand 
equity. That is, we are detracting from each independent variable, the effect due to the other 
independent variable.  
 
4. RESULTS. 
The descriptive evidence in Table 1 shows that the firms in our sample have a low concentrated 
ownership structure (mean value for the stake of the largest shareholder is 13.7%), customer 
satisfaction is, on average, greater than 50 on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, and these firms have large 
brand equity values. 
[Table 1 here] 
An analysis of the results (standardized coefficients) of the interaction between both channels 
(OC and CS) shows that OC has a positive impact on CS in the next period (coefficient 1.29, 1 % 
significant in the third column of Table 2) supporting Hypothesis 1; conversely, the impact of CS on 
the OC is negative (coefficient –0.12, 1 % significant in the third column of Table 3) thus supporting 
Hypothesis 2. These relationships will help to determine the kind of indirect connection between these 
two variables and brand equity. 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
The test for the connection between CS, OC and brand equity shows that OC has an overall 
positive impact on brand equity (coefficient 0.03, significant at 5 % level in column 3 of Table 4). This 
result also holds for CS (coefficient 0.01, significant at 1 % level in column 1 of Table 4). Both results 
support Hypotheses 3 and 4 partially. In order to separate the aforementioned direct and indirect 
effects, the specification of column 4 includes both variables OC and CS. The results show that OC 
has a direct negative effect on brand equity (coefficient -0.01, 5 % significant), while CS has a direct 
effect (coefficient 0.02,  1 % significant). Moreover, given the previous results connecting OC and CS 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2), two consequences follow: first, that OC has a positive impact on CS and that 
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the latter also has an overall positive impact on brand equity. This impact generates a positive indirect 
effect of OC on brand equity through CS that outweighs the direct negative one (coefficient -0.01, 5 % 
significant) because the overall effect is positive (coefficient 0.03,  5 % significant). This finding 
supports Hypothesis 3. Second, CS has an indirect negative effect on brand equity as this variable 
affects OC negatively and the latter has an overall positive effect on brand equity. Moreover, this 
negative indirect effect is lower than the positive direct one (coefficient 0.02,  1 % significant) given 
that the overall effect is positive (the aforementioned coefficient 0.01, significant at  1 % level), which 
conforms to Hypothesis 4. In terms of the control variables, the results show that larger firms (more 
visible) and firms that invest more on R&D, have larger brand equity values. 
Finally, in order to contrast the last aspect of Hypothesis 4, column 3 of Table 4 shows a 
specification that includes quadratic terms of CS. The theoretical contention is that substantial 
improvements in CS may give rise to an overall negative impact on BE through reductions in OC 
(indirect channel). The results of the third column of Table 4 show that there is a concave 
relationship between BE and OC, where the coefficient for the linear term is 0.05 (significant 
at 1% level) and that of the quadratic term is -0.036 (significant at 5%. Interestingly, this 
concave function reaches a maximum at the value 0.05/2(0.036)=69.44%. Beyond that value, 
the negative effect outweighs the positive one. Given that CS has a mean value of 57.7% (see 
Table 1) and that the upper quartile is beyond 69.9%, when CS has a value large enough (in 
the upper quartile), then, the overall effect of CS on brand equity is negative. This result 
suggests that the negative indirect effect between CS and brand equity through OC, as 
described, is relevant for large values of CS where it outweighs the positive direct one. This 
result is in accordance with Hypothesis 4. 
[Table 4 here] 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the relationship between the two dimensions underlying brand equity (BE). 
On the one hand, the value of a brand depends on the degree of customer satisfaction (CS); whereas, 
on the other hand, BE depends on shareholder commitment. Ownership concentration (OC) captures 
the latter dimension. The theoretical underpinnings of the paper suggest a close relationship between 
both dimensions and that a manager who wants to improve a firm’s BE should take both of these 
factors into consideration and not focus solely on customer-targeted marketing policies. This result is 
an important finding; although CS has a direct positive effect on a firm’s BE, CS has also an indirect 
negative one through reductions in OC. This scenario could be relevant when blockholders infer that a 
policy aimed at increasing CS substantially is, in fact, a managerial entrenchment strategy. Moreover, 
this latter indirect effect is relevant for large values of CS and may even outweigh the positive one. 
This paper contains some limitations that will be the subject of future research. First, the limited 
number of observations prevents exploring, at a higher level, the international content of the data in 
order to compare different institutional frameworks (Anglo-Saxon versus non-Anglo-Saxon 
countries). Second, the sample suffers problems of sample selection bias because the information on 
brand equity is only available for the corporations with higher brand values. However, this factor goes 
in favour of the results found because the entrenchment motive behind certain practices to satisfy 
customers are more evident in firms with lower brand values. In such corporations, managerial control 
is lower and, consequently, managerial entrenchment is more likely. Hence, the negative effect of CS 
on BE should appear even at low values of CS, and not in the upper quartile found. Last, the 
incorporation of other stakeholders, apart from customers, would enrich substantially the analysis and 
would allow investigating those whom a manager should satisfy in order to improve a firm’s BE. 
Finally, from our results some recommendations emerge concerning the prevention of a 
particular strategy – bundling; here, a firm encourages customers to remain loyal by giving them 
shares. Also, some workers’ payment schemes that rely on the  transfer of shares together with 
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discounted prices for a firm’s products may affect brand equity detrimentally, due to the negative 
impact from reductions in OC. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, the maximum and the minimum values of the 
main variables. 
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Minimum Maximum
      
Brand_Equity 64 8546.1 7143.2 1238.3 33499
Customer_Satisfaction 78 57.7 18.5 0.000 100
Ownership_Concentration 78 13.8 5.3 1.4 32.5
Leverage 78 2.3 1.9 0.2 8.6
Size 78 11.2 1.2 8.0 13
ROA 78 5.8 11.6 -84.2 21
R&D 78 15.6 21.6 0 90.6
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TABLE 2: Determinants of Customer Satisfaction 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating customer satisfaction in terms of ownership 
concentration and some control variables whose definition is in the text. The estimation of 
models in columns 2 and 3 is a two-stage least square where the instrument for the variable of 
Ownership_Concentration is the predicted value of this variable that results from the estimation 
of the specification (2) in the text. The dependent variable is lead by one period to reduce 
endogeneity problems. 
Dependent Variable Customer_Satisfaction Customer_Satisfaction (Instrumented) 
Customer_Satisfaction
(Instrumented) 
Ownership_Concentration 1.74*** (2.86) 
1.29***
(3.18)
Leverage -0.32(-0.85)
-0.95 
(-1.18) 
-0.02
(-0.05)
Size 0.29***(2.30)
0.24 
(1.34) 
0.24
(1.33)
R&D  
0.34**
(2.10)
Number of observations 78 78 78
R2 15.93% 42.33% 43.42%
Fitness test 34.42 (0.00) 1.98 (0.02) 1.94 (0.02)
Hausman Test 4.44 (0.62)  
***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. In parentheses the t-statistic. 
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TABLE 3: Determinants of Ownership Concentration 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating ownership concentration in terms of customer satisfaction and 
some control variables whose definition is in the text. The estimation of models in columns 1 and 2 use 
random-effects given that the Hausman test rules out the existence of unobservable heterogeneity 
correlated with the independent variables. The estimation of the model in column 3 is a two-stage least 
square where the instrument for the variable of Customer_Satisfaction is the predicted value of this 
variable that results from the estimation of the specification (1) in the text. The dependent variable is 
lead by one period to reduce endogeneity problems. 
Dependent Variable  Ownership_Concentration(Lead by one period)
Ownership_Concentration 
(Lead by one period) 
Ownership_Concentration
(Lead by one period)
(Instrumented)
Customer_Satisfaction  
-0.01* 
(-1.66) 
-0.12***
(-5.97)
Leverage 0.02(0.24)
0.06 
(1.05) 
0.18***
(2.30)
Size -0.02(-0.15)
0.32 
(0.88) 
0.45***
(3.64)
ROA 0.09(0.84)
-0.03 
(-0.49) 
0.07
(0.86)
Number of observat. 111 111 111
R2 30.23% 51.12% 64.68%
Fitness test 32.30 (0.05) 28.72 (0.02) 7.55 (0.00)
Hausman Test 1.35 (0.99) 11.22 (0.19) 
***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. In parentheses the t-statistic. 
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TABLE 4: Determinants of Brand Equity 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating brand equity in terms of ownership concentration and 
customer satisfaction as well as some control variables whose definition is in the text. The estimation 
of models in columns 1, 2 and 3 use random-effects given that the Hausman test rules out the existence 
of unobservable heterogeneity correlated with the independent variables. However, this is not true for 
the model of column 4 whose estimation relies on fixed-effect techniques. The dependent variable is 
lead by one period to reduce endogeneity problems. 
Dependent Variable 
Brand_Equity
(one period 
lead)
Brand_Equity
(one period 
lead)
Brand_Equity 
(one period 
lead) 
Brand_Equity
(one period 
lead)
Customer_Satisfaction 0.01***(2.35)
0.05***
(3.39)  
0.02***
(3.83)
Customer_Satisfaction $ 2 -0.04**(-2.26)   
Ownership_Concentration   
0.03** 
(1.79) 
-0.01**
(-2.29)
Leverage -0.26***(-0.97)
-0.30**
(-2.18)
0.02** 
(2.74) 
-0.25
(-0.16)
Size 0.08(4.07)
0.06
(4.04)
0.15** 
(2.00) 
0.09***
(7.91)
R&D 0.18***(5.86)
0.16***
(9.29)
0.19 *** 
(3.14) 
0.17***
(9.40)
Number of observations 43 43 94 43
R2 27.02% 20.94% 21.31% 27.25%
Fitness test (LR test) 495.17 (0.000) 2021.43 (0.000) 35.49 (0.000) 244.96 (0.000)
Hausman Test 0.78 (0.999) 5.580 (0.694) 1.77 (0.939) 16.09 (0.04)
***p-value  0.01, ** p-value 0.05, *p-value 0.10. In parentheses the t-statistic. 
 
